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Abstract
The present study investigates the characteristics of discussion of conspiracy theories about the Zika virus
outbreak of 2015–16 on Twitter. Content and social network analysis of a dataset of 25,162 original Tweets
about Zika virus conspiracy theories showed that relative to debunking messages, conspiracy theories spread
through a more decentralized network, are more likely to invoke supposedly knowledgeable authorities in
making arguments, and ask more rhetorical questions. These trends can be understood in the context of previous
work on conspiracy theories, including the ‘‘just asking questions’’ style of rhetoric, the importance of sourcing
and authority, and the tendency to simultaneously consider many different potential conspiracies that might
underlie an important topic or event.
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Introduction
Rumors are a consistent feature of social life. As a sense-making process, they can reduce anxiety and uncer-
tainty, and help people to come to grips with unfamiliar
situations.1 Of course, this comes at a cost—some rumors are
nothing more than gossip, some may be co-opted for propa-
ganda purposes, and many others are simply wrong.
Precisely because they help to make sense of the world,
rumors tend to arise in crisis situations, where the world does
not otherwise make much sense in its usual way.2 These
same situations also give rise to conspiracy theories, which,
much like rumors, can help people make sense of ambiguity.
Defined as suspicions that powerful people or organizations
are secretly carrying out sinister plans by deceiving the
public at large, conspiracy theories can provide an immedi-
ately understandable picture of a situation: why something
happened, who benefits from it, and who should be blamed.
It makes sense to ask whether conspiracy theories are just
another kind of rumor, and indeed some scholars have
reached conclusions along those lines.3
There are certainly some conceptual similarities between
rumors and conspiracy theories. However, are they psycho-
logically different? Do people believe or reject these things
for the same reasons? Previous work has defined rumors as
unverified propositions that make claims to truth and that
generally have personal relevance to the people who spread
and consume them.4 In that sense, at least some conspiracy
theories fit the definition of rumors. For example, conspiracy
theories alleging secret government persecution of African-
Americans (e.g., HIV/AIDS as a bioweapon created for
racial genocide) were popular in African-American com-
munities, particularly among people who felt victimized by
and alienated from institutions like government and politics.3
Experimental research has shown that conspiracy theories
about a particular event arise specifically from a need for
sense-making,5 and that this need is strongest when the event
in question is both severe and self-relevant—essentially the
same conditions under which rumors tend to arise.
Recently, the research literature on rumors and conspiracy
theories have begun to converge. In part, this seems to have
been driven by the quantity and visibility of online discourse
around conspiracy theories and the combination of qualita-
tive content analysis and big-data analytics that have come to
define the study of rumors.2,6–10 This recent research has
produced a few key results. First, conspiracy theories are like
rumors in that they act as an ongoing sense-making proce-
dure. They are constructed and spread discursively, evolving
and changing over time as new information comes along.10
Second, at least three predictors of rumor-mongering match
correlates of conspiracy theory: uncertainty, personal in-
volvement or relevance, and anxiety or stress.5,7,11 Finally,
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even though both conspiracy theories and rumors can be seen
as ways of dealing with uncertainty, they are characterized
by uncertainty themselves. For instance, work on Twitter
rumors about disaster events has shown that rumor-spreading
messages frequently demonstrate uncertainty, for instance
via the use of leading questions or expressions of incredu-
lity.9 Psychological research has shown that conspiracy
theories are often vague and uncertain, perhaps better un-
derstood as manifestations of broad suspicions than as de-
finitive, free-standing beliefs.6,12,13
The present study seeks to use some of the tools common
to the rumor literature and apply them to conspiracy theories
with a psychological lens. Through the analysis of social
networks and quantitative content, the present study exam-
ines several questions regarding the spread of conspiracy
theories on Twitter. As part of a case study, the analyses will
focus on conspiracy theories about the 2016 Zika virus
outbreak, with a particular eye toward comparing tweets that
propagate these theories with those that debunk them.
The Zika virus and its conspiracy theories
The mosquito-borne Zika virus was the subject of inter-
national media coverage starting in early 2016, when it was
linked to a rapid rise in microcephaly cases in Latin America.
The expert consensus was, and continues to be, that the virus
originated in Africa, is carried by the Aedes aegypti mos-
quito, and can cause microcephaly and other fetal abnor-
malities if a woman is infected early in pregnancy.14
Conspiracy theories about Zika take issue with these ideas.
One theory is that the virus is a bioweapon rather than a
natural occurrence. Another is that the virus is actually
harmless and the microcephaly epidemic is instead caused by
pesticides, genetically modified mosquitoes, or vaccine side
effects. Yet another claim is that Zika vaccine development
efforts are part of a broader plan for global depopulation.
Numerous other theories exist as well.10,15 The words
‘‘hoax’’ and ‘‘false flag’’ appear often. Many of these claims
have clear links to other conspiracy theories—for instance,
the biotechnology corporation Monsanto or the Rockefeller
business empire are sometimes presented as the most likely
perpetrators of the conspiracy, a typical pattern in conspiracy
discourse.12 In general, these theories spread on social media
and through discussion websites like Reddit,10 where they,
and the bits of evidence supporting or contradicting them,
were discussed and elaborated upon. This discussion is the
focus of the present study.
Network characteristics of propagation versus
those of debunking
Online discussion on social network services such as
Twitter and Facebook takes place, obviously, in networks.
Someone’s immediate network consists of his or her friends
or followers, but each of those friends has his or her own
connections. In this way, content can spread across the ser-
vice via personal connections: Person A posts a tweet which
is then seen and retweeted by Person B, then by Person C
(who saw it through his or her connection with B), and so on.
The propagation of information in this way can be analyzed
by means of social network analysis, which maps out the
connections of each member of the network and produces
summary statistics describing the network’s characteristics.
What similarities and differences might we expect between
the networks of those who propagate conspiracy theories and
those who debunk them?
One important characteristic of any network structure is its
degree of centralization, and for this factor, we might expect
to see a difference between propagators and debunkers.
Conspiracy theories are generally seen as counter-narratives
that arise in opposition to official or mainstream accounts,
and these theories generally exist in many competing vari-
ants.12,16 This would suggest that a propagator network
might be less centralized than a debunker network, which
might ‘‘follow the leader’’ in spreading official information
from recognized authorities. On the other hand, belief in a
given conspiracy theory is often provisional. A person’s
endorsement (for example, via retweeting) of a particular
conspiracy theory does not preclude that person from doing
the same for a different, contradictory theory—if anything, it
makes it more likely.13,17 Conspiracy theory networks may
have a few central nodes acting as clearinghouses of many
different, competing suspicions. Because of this tendency,
networks of propagators might be more centralized than
those of debunkers.
Message content
The Rumor Interaction Analysis System (RIAS) allows
quantitative classification of rumor-spreading messages ac-
cording to a few different criteria.1 Among other things,
RIAS examines messages for the expression of belief or
disbelief in a rumor, whether that message contains a di-
rective (e.g., ‘‘We need to stop this’’), and whether that
message shows an attempt to authenticate the information
within (e.g., by referring to a trusted source). This study uses
an adapted version of RIAS to examine the characteristics of
conspiracy theory tweets. Previously, conspiracy theories
were found to emerge in opposition to particular mainstream
or official accounts, and it was thought that rumors were
often accompanied by expressions of uncertainty.9,17 On the
basis of these characterizations, it was expected that tweets
propagating conspiracy theories would contain fewer au-
thentications and would use more rhetorical questions.
Method
Data collection
An archive of public tweets was solicited from Twitter by
using the Historical PowerTrack API. The data set comprised
88,523 tweets posted from September 1, 2015 through March
31, 2016. Each mentioned either Zika or microcephaly as
well as one of several keywords common to the various
conspiracy theories regarding the virus, such as ‘‘Monsanto’’
or ‘‘false flag’’ (see the Supplementary Data for the full
query used; Supplementary Data available online at www
.libertpub.com/cyber).
Coding
RIAS1 represents a good initial approach to coding Twitter
data, as the short messages lend themselves well to simple
coding. However, several of the original RIAS coding cate-
gories were not well suited to the present dataset, perhaps
because of the discrepancies in rumor types or lengths of
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outputs. As such, a modified version of RIAS was used for
the present study (Table 1).
The content of posted links was taken into account in
coding reference, belief, and disbelief. Initial coding was
conducted on a randomized subsample of 99 tweets by two
independent raters. Interrater agreement across all variables
was good to excellent, with the exception of directives, for
which there were no exemplars in the subsample (Table 1).
Overall chance-corrected multivariate interrater reliability
(iota) for all other variables was nearly perfect,18 with
i = 0.853.19,20 All remaining tweets were single coded.
Account-level analysis
The retweet network structure was analyzed by using the
R package igraph.21 First, the conspiracy orientation of each
user account was determined by its proportion of belief
tweets to the sum of its belief and disbelief tweets (either
authored or retweeted). Therefore, accounts with an orien-
tation score of 1 only expressed belief in Zika conspiracy
theories, while accounts with an orientation score of 0 only
expressed disbelief. Accounts were then organized into a
network graph in which vertices represented accounts and
edges represented retweet relationships.
Results
Overall sample characteristics and RIAS analysis
The sample encompassed 25,162 original tweets that re-
ferred to at least one Zika conspiracy theory. Of these,
17,421 expressed belief; 6,555 expressed disbelief; and
1,186 were ambivalent or ambiguous.
Analysis of the modified RIAS categories revealed sig-
nificant differences between belief and disbelief tweets in
terms of authenticating (belief 25.56 percent, disbelief 5.80
percent, v2[1]= 1,155.48, p < 0.001, u = 0.22), and rhetorical
questions (belief 14.90 percent, disbelief 9.37 percent,
v2[1] = 125.82, p < 0.001, u = 0.073). Directives were equally
uncommon across both categories: belief 0.51 percent, dis-
belief 0.53 percent, v2(1)= 0.08, p= 0.781. Figure 1 shows a
wordcloud22 of the most popular words in the corpus of all
tweets and retweets, colored according to their relative
prevalence in belief and disbelief tweets.
Retweet network analysis
Sixteen thousand five hundred eighty-seven accounts ex-
pressed belief in Zika conspiracy theories in over half of their
tweets and were thus classified as propagators, while 7,449
Table 1. The Adapted Version of the Rumor Interaction Analysis System,
with Interrater Reliability for Each Category
Code Description Characteristic example
Interrater
reliability
(Cohen’s j)
Reference Refers, directly or indirectly, to at least one
conspiracy theory. If not, the remaining
codes were unused.
‘‘The #zika conspiracy theories have
begun’’
0.898
Belief Expresses or strongly implies that a conspiracy
theory is, or is very likely to be, true
‘‘Clear evidence that Monsanto is
behind the zika hoax’’
0.919
Disbelief Expresses or strongly implies that the con-
spiracy theory is, or is very likely to be, false
‘‘Conspiracy theories about Zika are
idiotic, harmful, and short-sighted’’
0.841
Authenticating Refers explicitly to some authority, whether
self or others, to support an argument or
position
‘‘South American doctors say pesticides
are the TRUE cause of Zika virus’’
0.827
Directive Encourages audience to engage (or avoid
engaging) in some course of action
‘‘DO NOT get any so-called zika
vaccine #wakeup’’
N/A (none
in subsample)
Rhetorical
question
Asks a rhetorical or clearly leading question;
may include ‘‘clickbait’’-style headlines
‘‘Could these GMO mosquitoes be the
real cause of the Zika outbreak?’’
0.778
FIG. 1. The 200 most frequent words across all tweets and
retweets that expressed belief or disbelief in Zika virus
conspiracy theories. Size represents frequency of appear-
ance, and color represents the belief orientation of tweets
containing that word. Redder words were used proportio-
nately more often in tweets expressing belief in Zika con-
spiracy theories, and bluer words were used proportionately
more often in disbelief tweets.
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expressed disbelief in over half of their tweets and were thus
classified as debunkers. Two separate subnetworks were
analyzed: one of propagators retweeting propagators, and
one of debunkers retweeting debunkers (Fig. 2).
Freeman centralization was calculated separately for each
subnetwork on the basis of undirected degree centrality.
Freeman centralization is a measure of the degree to which
the most central node of a network is more central than the
other nodes; values can range from 0 (completely inter-
connected) to 1 (completely centralized). Consistent with
the hypothesis, the propagator network was less centralized
than the debunker network (0.0365 vs. 0.0820). The analysis
produced the same general pattern of results when centrality
calculations were based on a directed graph, so that accounts
that retweeted prolifically but were rarely retweeted were
given low centrality values.
Discussion
The present study set out to investigate the characteristics
of conspiracy theory discussions on Twitter through the lens
of rumor theory and through social network analysis. The
results showed that in propagator tweets, more rhetorical
questions were asked and a greater number of claims in-
cluded explicit references to authorities. In addition, the
propagator network was relatively more decentralized (and
considerably larger) than the debunker network.
The greater prevalence of rhetorical questions in propa-
gator tweets matches the previous observation that rumor
spread is often accompanied by disclaimers of uncertainty,9
as well as the pattern of ‘‘just asking questions’’ as a common
rhetorical characteristic of conspiracy theory.23 This style of
argument uses leading questions to undermine rival expla-
nations without opening oneself up to criticism by providing
an alternative. Surprisingly, and contrary to predictions,
propagator tweets also made more explicit references to
sources for their claims. A great deal of these referred to a
single entity: Physicians in the Crop-Sprayed Towns (PCST),
an Argentine anti-pesticide activist group alleging that the
mosquito larvicide Pyriproxyfen was the true case of the
microcephaly outbreak.24 This version of the insecticide
conspiracy theory was very popular: 14 percent of the original
tweets in the dataset contained the word ‘‘doctors,’’ which
almost always referred to PCST. While the importance of
authenticating statements in the spread of conspiracy theory
has not yet been observed in the empirical literature, there is
some precedent for it in theoretical work on conspiracy the-
ory. Several scholars have noted that conspiracy texts often
overuse citations, allegedly as a way of seeming more re-
spectable, academic, or well-grounded.23 Given the overrep-
resentation of the PCST/Pyriproxyfen conspiracy theory in
this dataset, it is not clear whether this is a general tendency or
a peculiarity of the Zika virus conspiracy theories themselves.
The difference in centralization is in line with previous
findings of a distributed (though interconnected) alternative
media ecosystem involved in the manufacture and promotion
of conspiracy narratives.8 In contrast to this decentralized
propagator network, the debunker network was more heavily
centralized around a few highly influential mainstream media
accounts (PolitiFact and The New York Times were the most
widely retweeted debunkers). Intuitively, ‘‘official’’ expla-
nations are the purview of highly influential epistemic au-
thorities, while the conspiracy theories that challenge them
are the product of a relatively decentralized, ‘‘grassroots’’
sense-making effort. Here, we see that debunking conspiracy
theories rely on a few highly influential official or authori-
tative sources, while the conspiracy theories themselves arise
in a broader fashion without such centralized information.
Yet the opposite pattern was observed in the data here: the
propagator network was more heavily centralized around a
few highly influential accounts. Still, as is clear from the
graphs, influential accounts exist within the propagator
sphere. Many of the more successful conspiracy theories were
disseminated widely by some highly influential users. The
diversity of conspiracy theories is not an obstacle here, either.
While Zika cannot be both a deadly bioweapon and a harm-
less scapegoat for pesticide side effects, these conflicting
theories found traction within the same networks (and often
the same accounts). Future research could focus further on the
role of the influential propagators that shape the dynamics of
their network, as well as their more powerful counterparts in
the debunking network.
The conclusions drawn here are limited somewhat because
data collection was limited to messages written only in
FIG. 2. Fruchterman-Reingold plots of the retweet networks formed by all accounts (left), conspiracy theory propagator
accounts (middle), and debunker accounts (right). Nodes are colored in accordance with their conspiracy orientation on a
gradient from red (propagator) to blue (debunker). Vertices are colored as the midpoint between the two connected nodes.
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English. Although there have been cases of Zika in English-
speaking countries, the epidemic primarily affected Latin
American countries, particularly Brazil. The threat and un-
certainty produced by the virus might therefore have been
much stronger and more visible in Portuguese or Spanish
messages, and future research on Zika rumors could compare
how these ideas spread across cultural, national, and lin-
guistic boundaries (with the necessary care taken to use ap-
propriate data pre-processing25,26).
For much of the present sample, the risk of infection was
mostly theoretical. However, it is unclear whether this would
have meaningfully affected the pattern of results. A higher
degree of threat may have accentuated the differences ob-
served between conspiracy theory propagators and debunk-
ers in this sample. Still, non-English-language research on
conspiracy theories is generally underrepresented in the
current canonical work on the subject;, and psychological
research in particular has been criticized for overreliance on
samples from the United States.27
It is not clear whether the current findings generalize
well across cultural contexts—or indeed across conspir-
acy theories. Future research on this issue should examine
conspiracy theories regarding other topics. In particular,
conspiracy theories with clearer partisan or ideological
divisions28 or about singular events (rather than an ongo-
ing epidemic) might give rise to different network struc-
tures. Finally, while much research has been done on what
prompts rejection or acceptance of conspiracy theories,
there has been relatively little work on the moderating role
of elites or trusted sources.29 On the basis of our study
results, it would make sense to examine how the particu-
larly influential individuals and organizations at the cen-
ters of their respective networks cultivate influence over
and the trust of their audiences.30
The present study has shown that conspiracy theories can
be considered a form of rumor and analyzed on that basis:
the patterns of behavior in propagator messages matched the
predictions from prior research on conspiracy belief. The
structure of the retweet network reinforces the essential and
decentralization of conspiracy theories and the importance
of influential individuals in spreading and debunking rumors
and misinformation.
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